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VIRTUALLY EMBODYING THE FIELD
 SILENT ONLINE BUDDHIST MEDITATION, IMMERSION, 
AND THE CARDEAN ETHNOGRAPHIC METHOD1
GREGORY PRICE GRIEVE
“Information does not simply represent a body or corporeal experience; 
 it renders the emergent properties and capacities of bodies.” 
Anna Munster (2006, 180).
 “By using the body in different ways, I stumbled on (but never fully 
 assimilated) practices distinct from my own.” 
Robert Desjarlais (1992, 27).
On December  12,  2008,  about  a year  into my ethnography of  Buddhist  communities  on Second Life,  I 
received an email reminder that 20 minutes of silent mediation was going to start at the Upaya Mountain Zen 
Retreat.2 Second Life is a 3D immersive virtual world, in which users control avatars that are able to create 
content as well as make their own list of friends, join or create groups, and communicate using chat, instant 
messaging or voice.3 As of August 13, 2010, Second Life had over twenty million registered accounts, and 
1,373,248 residents had logged in during the last thirty days. The Upaya Mountain Zen Retreat is part of a 
Buddhist  community  on  Second  Life  that  consists  of  five  groups,  and  as  of  January  2010,  had  2,756 
members, five regions, and held approximately 85 events a week. For these Zen groups, while they engage in 
a wide range of activities, from Dharma talks to camp fire concerts, the most important practice is silent 
online meditation. 
The email’s ‘ping’ took my attention out of the word processing document in which I was entangled, and I 
became aware of what Ludwig Wittgenstein calls the ‘hurly-burly’ background: “the music playing in my 
1
 This essay “rezzed” during “How Virtual is the Real? Research into Digital Worlds,” held at Jacobs University, North 
Bremen, Germany in August 2010. I would like to thank the students, organizers and other researchers, especially 
Kerstin Radde-Antweiler, Simone Heidbrink, Ann-Kathrin Gaida, David Morgan, and Christopher Helland for their 
insights. 
2 Upaya Moutain Zen Retreat is a pseudonym . . Whether to use an informant’s real name or to use a pseudonym is one 
of the most challenging choices an ethnography has to make . . There is no universal rule and it needs to be decided on a 
case-by-case basis. This choice becomes even more difficult, when one is doing research in virtual worlds where the 
people already have anonymity because their avatars have different names from their real life selves . . In this article, 
when the data was gathered from publically published documents such as websites, groups or note cards, I used the 
actual avatar’s name (but not their real life name), and the actual name of the groups . . When the data was gathered 
from interviews, surveys or participant observation I used pseudonyms for avatar’s names, regions and groups. 
3 See Second Life http://secondlife.com/. Retrieved 15 August 2010.
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office, hum of the air conditioner, and a slight trembling from the train rattling by a few blocks away”. 4 I 
logged onto the Second Life Viewer program much as one would a web browser, such as Safari or Firefox.5 
After typing in my name and password, my avatar materialized in my home in Second Life. I, or at least my 
avatar  -  a  stern  looking  man  in  Buddhist  monk  robes  -  stood  on  the  porch  of  my  Second  Life  home 
overlooking a sunset on a rocky ocean coast. While once just the dreams of science fiction, logging onto 
virtual worlds located in cyberspace and housed on the Internet has become a commonplace occurrence for 
millions of users around the globe.6 Yet, while a common occurrence, it still raises many questions. What are 
the mediated practices that enable ‘logging on’? What does it mean to ‘be’ in a virtual world such as Second 
Life? What  is  the  ‘shock experience,’  to  borrow a  phrase from the phenomenologist  Alfred Schutz,  “of 
leaping into the alternative worlds created by dreams, theater, visual culture, play and cyberspace”?7 And 
what method is best suited for studying religion in virtual worlds such as Second Life?
Such questions lead to the Cardean Virtual Research Team (CVRT)’s ethnographic fieldwork of Second 
Life’s Buddhist community.  The Cardean Virtual Research Team, which in its final form consisted of the 
principle investigator, four advanced undergraduates and one graduate student, will have conducted research 
between February 2008 and September 2010. While the research was conducted almost entirely within the 
virtual world of Second Life, the Cardean Virtual Research Team employed a classic ethnographic method 
consisting of  Malinowski’s ([1961]1922) practices of participant observation and  Clifford Geertz’s (1973) 
thick description.8 During our fieldwork we explored temples, prostrated before Buddha images,  went  to 
Dharma talks, and argued in open discussions about the nature of Buddhism. Our research hinged, however, 
on participant observation of online silent meditation (Figure 1).9
4 See Wittgenstein 1980, 97.
5 See Safari, http://www.apple.com/safari/. Retrieved 15 August 2010; Mozilla http://www.mozilla.com/en-
US/firefox/firefox.html. Retrieved 15 August 2010.
6 In 2007 comScore estimated that 271 million people play online games each month (see Worldwide Online Gaming 
Community Reaches 217 Million People, 
http://www.comscore.com/Press_Events/Press_Releases/2007/07/Worldwide_Online_Gaming_Grows. Retrieved 19 
August 2010) . . For the two most influential Science fiction books see Gibson 2004 and Stephenson 1992. 
7 See Schutz 1962, 231.
8 See Grieve & Heston 2011.
9 For a video clip of silent online mediation see Just Sitting Online, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r5Y4ij0xG5k. 
Retrieved 15 August 2010. 
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Figure 1: Buddhist silent online mediation at Upaya Mountain Zen Retreat.
Often posed as the essence of Zen Buddhist practice, and definitely understood as the heart of Zen by the 
majority of Second Life practitioners, the aim of Zen Buddhist silent meditation, or zazen, is just sitting.
Can one ‘just sit’ online? While we never doubted the validity of doing ethnography in Second Life, we 
often ran up against skeptics. Just a little over a decade ago, the anthropologist  James Clifford declared in 
"Routes: Travel and Translation in the Late Twentieth Century", that such online ethnographic studies were at 
best ‘awkward’. “What if someone studied the culture of computer hackers [...] and in the process never 
‘interfaced’ in the flesh?”10 He answers that, while he believes that such an online study passes the duel test 
of length-of-stay and interactivity, for most anthropologists such ‘disembodied’ research would still not be 
“currently acceptable as fieldwork” (ibid). What seems to be missing for most scholars from online virtual 
worlds is ‘immersion’ -  the sense that you are ‘there’.  Immersion  creates  an experience of locatedness “in 
which an individual perceives himself or herself as being present or having ‘presence’”.11
Clifford’s work, even if dated, exposes the shortcomings of current studies that claim people are immersed 
in virtual worlds because of sensorial realism or collective projects.12 Instead, as I argue here through the lens 
of silent online meditation, what makes ethnography possible is in worlds such as Second Life is ‘virtual 
embodiment.’ When logged onto such places as Second Life, while one’s fingers type on the keyboard, one is 
also ‘virtually embodied’ in a transversal world. I am not arguing the untenable position that somehow, as in 
the  movie  Tron  (1982),  one  drags  one’s  physical  body  into  cyberspace.  Instead,  using  Judith  Butler’s 
understanding  of  the  body  as  practice,  I  maintain  that  a  theory  of  virtual  embodiment  differentiates 
immersion as performance from immersion as a proprioceptive sensation. In such a case, virtual embodiment 
can be defined as an immersed bodily performance that occurs in cyberspace. 
A theory of virtual embodiment is significant to the study of online religion in three ways. First, virtual 
embodiment shows why ethnography is possible in cyberspace, and allows for the construction of models to 
10 See Clifford 1997, 61.
11 See Blasovich 2002, 129.
12 See Boellstorff 2008; Golub 2010.
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explain online identity and community (particularly what I have called residents and cloud communities).13 
Second,  virtual  embodiment  illuminates  why virtual  worlds,  either  3D graphic  or  textual  platforms,  are 
distinct areas of research compared to other online environments such as web pages and blogs. I am not 
arguing that virtual worlds are dichotomized, and radically different from other online media, but rather that 
they have a higher degree of virtual embodiment and thus deserve a different method of study. Third, virtual 
embodiment  illustrates  that  religion—even virtual  religion—does  not  just  happen in  people’s  minds  but 
requires bodies, and thus exposes these bodies as ‘a cultural sign’.14 Virtual embodiment indicates that the 
Body is not a preexisting stable platform on which one inscribes an identity, but rather a condensation of 
performances, feelings and desires grounded in lived practices. 
To make this argument the paper proceeds as follows. First,  it theorizes the virtually embodied field. 
Because the  Cardean Virtual Research Team conducted some of the first ethnography in Second Life, we 
found ourselves facing a two-sided methodological problem. We had to theorize the virtual and its relation to 
the actual, while simultaneously creating practices for an effective ethnographic method. Named after the 
Roman Goddess, Cardea, our method uses the model of a hinge to theorize the virtual as desubtantialized and 
the worlds opened up by cyberspace as nondualistic. Second, the paper describes the virtually embodied field 
through the concepts of ‘resident’ and ‘cloud community.’ A ‘resident’ defines that social entity, both cultural 
and legal, that weaves together an avatar and its user within the broader social context of the cyberworld. A 
‘cloud community’ defines an online group that is temporary, flexible, elastic and is inexpensive in the social 
capital required to join or to leave. Third, utilizing Judith Bulter’s theory of Gender, we define the virtual 
body as a ‘stylized repetition of acts,’ which is both constrained and constituted by cultural and historically 
specific norms. Finally, the paper defines virtual embodiment as the subjectification that occurs to a body 
lived in cyberspace. 
Theorizing the Virtually Embodied Field: The Cardean Method as a 
Desubtantialized and Nondualistic Model
After logging onto Second Life, the actual world receded and I became aware of ‘being’ my avatar. I was no 
longer just typing on the keyboard, but also aware of standing on the porch of my home in Second Life. I  
looked at  the  map  and could  tell  that  a  number  of  people  were  already sitting  at  the  nearby  zendo or 
meditation hall. It was too far to walk, and one cannot fly in this region, so I teleported over. I ‘rezzed’ 
(materialized) in front of a wooden building, through the glass doors of which I could see a long wooden altar 
with incense, candles, flowers and a large statue of  Shakyamuni Buddha. I pushed through the door and 
13 See Grieve & Heston 2011.
14 See Butler 1990, 90.
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greeted everyone with a gassho, a gesture of palms together and fingers pointing upwards in prayer position. 
Typically in the virtual Buddhist communities that I studied, during silent meditation between ten and twenty 
Second Life  residents  sit  on virtual  cushions  and sitting mats  (zafus  and  zabutons).  On this  day,  I  was 
welcomed with the word “namaste” by many of the sixteen practitioners, who run the gamut from those 
dressed in Zen monastic garb, to those who look like they should be out clubbing, to elves, one Gorean, and a 
small goat-like animal. The avatars are being controlled by people, who, like me, are currently logged onto 
Second Life. They could be located in the same room, as I, or they could be on another continent. 
Can one conduct  ethnography in  such a  virtual  and highly mediated  community?  Can ethnographers 
telecommute?  Can  one  be  immersed  in  other  worlds  while  sitting  in  front  of  a  computer  screen?  As 
Malinowski  cautioned, researchers should not  sit  in their armchairs theorizing from a distance,  but must 
spend time learning about, and from, groups of people in their natural surroundings.15 Because of virtual 
embodiment we found Second Life to be a valid ethnographic field. We found that the chief reason for the 
reluctance of  others  to  see  cyberspace  as  a  valid  site  of  ethnographic  research is  because the  virtual  is 
assumed to be fake, and thus one is considered to not really be there. Yet, the distinction between ‘armchair’ 
and ‘field’ is breaking down. The myth of the ethnographic field as a discreet, bounded geographic locale is 
proving to be increasingly outdated and untenable as globalization and mediation blur the boundary between 
‘here’ and ‘there’.16 In fact, a ‘field site’ can no longer be seen merely as a physical location, but rather must 
be viewed as the intersection between people, practices, and shifting terrains, both physical and virtual. 
The assumption of unreality and its lack of immersion leads to three dominant models of the virtual in 
contemporary computer-driven cyberspace17 (Table 1). 
Table 1: Theories of the Virtual, models of its relation to the actual, and corresponding conception of the 
nature of cyberspace
Theories of the 
Virtual
Relation with 
the actual
Conception of 
Cyberspace
Corresponden
ce
Simulation of the 
actual 
Ludicrous Space of gaming
Suppletion Substitution for the 
actual
Utopic Space of 
realization 
Apocalyptic Extermination of the 
actual
Dystopic Space of 
addiction
Cardean (the 
Hinge)
Desubtantialization of 
the actual
Nondualistic Space of 
transversality
15 See Malinowski [1961]1922, 7.
16 See Kohn 1995; Fox 1991; Gupta & Ferguson, 1997, 5.
17 See Doel & Clarke 1999, 261-283.
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The  first  model,  based  on  the  correspondence  theory  of  representation,  maintains  that  the  virtual  is  a 
simulation, a false approximation of the real. That is, that virtual online mediation is at best a pale imitation 
of actual world practices. The correspondence model tends to see the virtual communities as ludicrous (a 
word stemming from Latin term ludus, meaning game), and causes people to dismiss such cyberspace as a 
place of play. The second model, an inversion of the first, is the suppletion of the real, where the virtual 
substitutes for what is partial, lacking, and imperfect in the actual world. In this case, many are unable to 
meditate in the actual world - one could be physically disabled or agoraphobic - and the virtual allows one to 
realize one’s desire. The suppletion model often breeds utopic narratives about users finding their true selves, 
true communities,  or  both, through the use of different  online genders and even species.  The suppletion 
theory  sees  cyberspace  as  a  place  of  realization.  In  the  third,  apocalyptic  model,  the  virtual  creates  a 
“resolution of the world ahead of time by the cloning of reality [which causes] the extermination of the real 
by its  double”.18 For example,  it  gives rise to the notion that,  because people may spend so much time 
meditating in  the  virtual  world,  they cease  to  meditate  in  the  real  one.  The apocalyptic  model  tends  to 
generate dystopic narratives of the destruction of users’ actual world lives, and breeds tales of addiction. 
These three theories, however, are based on a notion of the virtual as that which  seems to be there as 
opposed to what is actually there19. The virtual, then, denotes a distinction of ‘almost so’. This understanding 
arose because the virtual is tethered to interactive computer systems which are highly mediated. In other 
words, to more clearly see the virtual we need to disambiguate it from two currently intertwined concepts: 
‘Internet’ and ‘cyberspace.’ The ‘Internet’ denotes the hardware and software that comprise a global system 
of interconnected computer networks. The Internet originated in California in 1969 with the ARPANET, 
which was funded by the United States Department of Defense, and as of today an estimated quarter of the 
Earth’s  population has access to it.20 ‘Cyberspace’  on the other hand,  denotes the mediated social  space 
created by interconnected electronic communications. It differs from telecommunication, which has a sender 
and a  receiver,  in  that  cyberspace  occurs  in  a  third virtual  social  environment.21 Linked to  the  Internet, 
cyberspaces enable interactive immersive environments  that put a user in contact  with other residents of 
digital  worlds  and  offer  a  new  place  and  form  of  socialization.22 Such  worlds  can  be  textual,  as  in 
newsgroups, chat rooms and MUDs, or can use computer graphics to render 3D models as in Second Life.
Too often virtual worlds are described as if  they were something created whole cloth by these digital 
networks. Yet, being immersed in virtual worlds is nothing new. For instance, being immersed in a good 
novel, or in a film, or even a well-told story, can be understood as forms of the virtual. In fact, it can be 
18 See Baudrillard 1996, 25.
19 See Rheingold 1991, 177.
20 See Hafner & Matthew, 1996.
21 See Krueger 1991.
22 See Rheingold 1992.
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argued that virtual worlds have followed human culture from its very beginning.23 As Michel Serres writes in 
his book Atlas: “[i]magination, memory, knowledge and religion are the vectors of virtualization that have 
enabled us to leave this ‘there’ long before the appearance of computerization and digital networks”.24 Nor 
are virtual worlds dependent on cyberspace. For example, Margaret Wertheim argues that Giotto’s Arena 
Chapel  in  Padu transported  viewers  out  of  reality  into  an  architecturally  virtual  space.  She  argues  that 
Giotto’s work “blur[s] the boundary between the virtual space of the image and the physical space of the 
chapel”.25 
If  one  disambiguates ‘virtual’  from  ‘cyberspace’  one  finds  that  virtualities  are  neither  ‘fake’,  nor 
immaterial, but rather are desubstantialized. That is, the virtual cannot be reduced to material or ideal, but is a 
set of processes dependent on the actual, and realized in it, but irreducible to a physical system. In such a 
case, the virtual, as Pierre Lévy argues in “Qu  ' est  -ce que le   virtuel  ?  ” “has little affinity with the false, the 
illusory or imaginary. Nor does it mean the opposite of reality”.26 For instance, the experience created by 
watching a film is dependent on the physical celluloid but its significance cannot be reduced to it. If one sees 
the virtual as desubstantialized, a fourth model appears. This can be theorized as the hinge, which models the 
virtual world and the actual as nondualistic (Figure 2). 
Figure  2:  The Hinge.  If  virtual  worlds  are  theorized  as  desubtantialized,  then the experience  (a)  of  the 
relationship between the virtual  (b) and actual  (c)  is  not  one of  real  and unreal,  but  rather  nondualistic. 
Nondualism indicates that things appear distinct while not being separate, and affirms the understanding that 
while distinctions exist, dichotomies are illusory phenomenon.
23 See Fornäs et al 2002, 30.
24 Cited in Lévy 1998, 28.
25 See Wertheim 1999, 76.
26 See Lévy 1995.
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Nondualism indicates that things appear distinct while not being separate, and affirms the understanding that 
while distinctions exist, dichotomies are illusory phenomena. For instance, a virtual body is distinct from an 
actual body, but there is no essential difference between them. They are both cultural practices. The hinge 
places you in two worlds at once, and causes one to be transversal. That is, perception of the virtual pivots in 
two or more intersecting but parallel  social positions. In fact,  virtualization impedes us from thinking in 
schemes of binary dichotomies and in dialectic notions of synthesis.27 
In the case of the Cardean ‘Hinge’ model, while actual embodiment and virtual embodiment are distinct, 
they cannot be dichotomized as real and simulated. Instead, both are real, because the virtual and the actual 
produce an effect.28 This notion of ‘effect’ is illuminated by the word’s etymology that derives from the Latin 
virtus,  which means power, efficacy and can be traced back to vir, manliness, excellence, and virtuousness 
(as in virility). As Charles Sanders Peirce writes, “A virtual X (where X is a common noun) is something, not 
an X, which has the efficiency (virtus) of an X …”29
Describing The Virtually Embodied Field: Second Life’s Buddhist Residents and Cloud Communities
Following mouse and keyboard instructions one can explore Second Life, which includes 3D builds such as 
the Upaya Mountain Zen Retreat’s meditation hall. One can communicate with other residents via voice and 
built-in public chat and instant messaging. Residents can buy and make clothes, objects, and buildings, as 
well as buy and rent property. One can conduct businesses using the inworld currency the Linden, run non-
profit and educational groups, role-play, and socialize in any number of ways. When I asked Second Life 
residents how they would describe the virtual world, most would reply like Fae Lilac, who laughed and said, 
"You have to experience it for yourself to really understand it" (personal communication May 15, 2009). 
Others described it as a “SIM[ulation],” or a multi-user platform such as World of Warcraft in which you take 
on an assumed persona and interact  with other players.  Night  Jones said,  “think of a peaceful  Warcraft 
without fees” (personal communication May 23, 2009). Most residents wanted to stress Second Life’s unique 
social network. As Dawn Light said, “I usually liken [Second Life] to something between a video game and a 
chat room. [...] .[Yet in] Second Life there is no game, in fact no particular plan at all, and is up to each 
person’s imagination” (personal communication May 23, 2009).
To articulate the ‘native’ perspective, Second Life can be seen as a virtually embodied field that can be 
analyzed through the categories of residents and cloud communities. These categories are illuminated through 
the  Buddhist  concepts  of  anātman  and  sangha.  Because it  opens up and extends the notion of self,  the 
27 See Nuesselder 2006, 35.
28 See Lévy 1998, 30. 
29 See Peirce 1902, 763, cited in Nuesselder 2006, 34.
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Buddhist concept of  anātman illuminates how subjectification works on Second Life.  Anātman, which can 
roughly be translated as ‘not-self’, is a doctrine that holds that  there is no permanent, integral, autonomous 
subject. The idea of self that one clings to, one’s personality and ego, are temporary creations which are 
dependant  and  interpenetrated  by  others.  From  a  Buddhist  perspective,  online  selves  are  not  copies, 
simulations or fake. Instead they extend the self into new social spaces. In Second Life users assume an 
identity by creating an online character—an ‘avatar’. In computing, an avatar is the on-screen representation 
of the user(s), which can be a three-dimensional model such as in Second Life, a two-dimensional icon as 
used in many chat forums, or a textual description as used in MUDS (Multi-User Dungeon). In Second Life, 
the default avatar shape is humanoid, but it can be customized through a graphical user interface that can 
modify gender, body shape, skin, hairstyle and clothes. Moreover, one can purchase or create bodies and 
clothes as well as attachments, animation and sonic (voice) overrides. Such customization results in male, 
female and androgynous human avatars, as well as animal, robot, neko, furries and other fantasy creatures 
such as dragons. 
In Second Life a ‘resident’ is that social entity, both cultural and legal, which weaves together an avatar 
and its user within the broader social context of the cyberworld (Figure 3). 
Figure 3: A resident. ‘User’ refers to the actual person ‘behind the keyboard’, ‘avatar’ refers to the online 
image of a user’s ‘virtual representative’, and ‘resident’ refers to the cybersocial entity that is activated in 
Second Life by the presence of the avatar, operated by the user, and socialized by interaction with other 
residents, their avatars, and occasionally the users themselves.
Linden Lab, the makers of the Second Life grid, defines a ‘resident’ as "a uniquely named avatar with the 
right  to  log  into  Second  Life,  trade  Linden  Dollars  and  visit  the  Community  pages".30 In  Second  Life 
residents are governed by terms of service (TOS), which specifically allow users to retain all intellectual 
property rights in the digital content they create or own in Second Life. In my research I employ the word 
‘user’ to refer to the actual person ‘behind the keyboard’, ‘avatar’ to refer to the online image of a user’s 
‘virtual representative’, and ‘resident’ to indicate the cybersocial entity that is activated in Second Life by the 
30 Cited in Fetscherin & Lattmann 2007, 8.
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presence of the avatar, operated by the user, and socialized by interaction with other residents, their avatars, 
and occasionally the users themselves. It is important to remember that a ‘resident’ is not always a one-to-one 
relationship between a real life user and a virtual representation. As with most website user accounts, several 
avatars  might  belong to  one user,  and conversely one avatar  might  be  operated by more  than one user 
sequentially,  or in some cases by more than one user at the same time,  as in the situation of one avatar 
controlled by nine disabled persons (AU 2004). 
Theoretically, and thinking back to the concept of anātman, residents can be understood as cyborg, fluid 
selves, whose bodies are multiple, and distributed across a number of ‘windows’. As Valentine Daniel argues, 
selves are signs: “As a semiotic sign [they] are never actual: [they] are always virtual.”31 Donna Haraway 
writes that a “cyborg is a cybernetic organism, a hybrid of machine and organism, a creature of social reality 
as well as a creature of fiction”.32 Sherry Turkle uses the metaphor of computer screen windows to illustrate 
how residents cycle through cyberspace and the actual world.33 For Turkle, "[t]he self is no longer simply 
playing different roles in different settings at different times”. Instead “The life practice of windows is that of 
a decentered self that exists in many worlds, that plays many roles at the same time." As Turkle writes, “Now 
real life itself may be, as one of [her] subjects says, ‘just one more window’”.34
Because  it  extends  the  notion  of  community  beyond  face-to-face  interaction,  the  Buddhist  notion  of 
sangha helps  open  up  an  understanding  of  communities  on  Second  Life.  In  Buddhism,  community  is 
understood through ‘sangha’,  a  word used to  denote  a  group of monks,  the larger  community that  also 
includes lay practioners, and in the most general sense denotes the assembly of all beings on the path to 
awakening.  More generally,  the term ‘community’  defines a group that forms relationships over time by 
interacting on a  regular  basis  around a  set  of  shared experiences  –  this  could be car  enthusiasts  or  the 
members of a remote mountain village. Over the last 2,500 years Buddhist communities have been shaped 
and reshaped as  they spread throughout  Asia.  Over the  last  century,  Buddhism has  taken new forms  in 
America and other Western locations. Gary Ray’s creation of the “BodhiNet Bylaws” in 1991 introduced 
“Cyber-sanghas” to the Internet. Over the last decade, the process of online reshaping flowed into virtual 
worlds such as Second Life. 
A ‘cloud community’ is an online group that is temporary, flexible, elastic and is inexpensive in the social 
capital required to join or to leave. I borrow the notion of the ‘cloud’ from computing where it signifies an 
architecture in which users access resources online from a host of different servers – Google docs, Blist and 
Sliderocket would be examples. Cloud computing users do not invest in infrastructure. Instead, they rent what 
they need when they need it35 (Figure 4).
31 See Daniel & Pugh 1984. 
32 See Haraway 1991, 149.
33 See Turkle 1984.
34 See Turkle 1996.
35 See Barnatt 2008.
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Figure 4:  Second Life’s Zen Buddhist  Community Cloud.  A ‘cloud community’  is  an online group that  is 
temporary, flexible and elastic. People do not invest, rather they rent what community they need when they 
need it.
The Body Which is Not One
We have defined the virtual as desubtantialized and nondualistic. We have gone on to describe the denizens 
of the cyberspaces opened up by the Internet as residents, and their associations as cloud communities. We 
have not, however, answered the more fundamental question: Where do our bodies go when we log on? In the 
Upaya Mountain Zen Retreat’s meditation hall are cushions, laid out in semi-circular lines. On December 12, 
2008, I walked across the hall, and by clicking on one of the cushions sat in perfect full lotus. Fifteen other 
people faced the altar with me. There were two cushions facing away from the altar and between them a 
meditation gong, which is referred to as the ‘bell’. Sitting on the right cushion facing away from the altar was 
the meditation leader or timekeeper who and I quote from information given to me when I was trained for this 
job “is the person who holds the meditative space for the sitting practice of others.” As the time drew near, 
more people straggled in. Just before the start of the meditation period, the timekeeper typed in public chat: 
“Please prepare for thirty minutes of silent meditation.”
We sat. It is often argued that we leave our bodies behind upon entering virtual worlds. This assumption is 
sustained  by  the ideology  surrounding  virtual  worlds  which  has  been  continued  by  a  rhetoric  of 
dematerialization.  In fact, it is often argued that cyberspace makes the body obsolete. The corollary is also 
maintained. That is, that online media is a ‘body snatcher’ which will destroy our bodies36. Unlike a Buddhist 
perspective, both sides of the argument, however, assume (1) a permanent and stable thing called the body; 
36 See O’Leary 1997.
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(2) a split between body and machine, as well as (3) a dichotomy between material and information. All three 
assumptions map comfortably onto the Cartesian dichotomy between mind and body,  and the even older 
Christian doctrine of the flesh and soul.
If we do leave our bodies behind, online meditation is particularly problematic for Zen practice, which is 
often posited as being about direct unmediated experience. As spelled out by Bodhidharma, (the 5th century 
Indian Buddhist  monk who is  traditionally credited with bringing Zen to China),  what  defines  Zen is  a 
“special transmission of Buddhism distinct from the teachings, which is not dependent on words or letters.” If 
this  is  the  case  how  can  you  meditate  online?  Digital  immigrants,  especially  those  who  have  studied 
Buddhism, already know the easiest answer—online meditation is ludicrous (cf. the Latin “ludus” meaning 
game).37 For  those  who  have  just  dipped  their  toe  into  the  great  worldwide  ocean  of  the  Web,  online 
meditation cannot help but seem frivolous at best and or ideological at worst. Yet, accusing practitioners of 
fakery is a little like the French entomologist Antoine Magnan, who argued that bumblebees cannot fly. He 
forgot to speak with the bumblebee. In other words, more and more people are using new media for Buddhist 
purposes.  At the simplest  level,  the Internet  has made  Buddhist  scriptures,  resources,  and databases and 
journals much more available. Yet, more radically at least since 1998 and the opening of the website “Daily 
Zen Meditation,” zazen itself has been offered online on the World Wide Web.38
Rather than declaring the practice ludicrous, online silent meditation should make us reflexively ask, as 
Judith Butler does in Subjects of Desire, “How do we conceive of the body as a concrete scene of cultural 
struggle?”39 Following Butler, one should maintain that the body is not so much a thing as a project, a skill, a 
pursuit,  an enterprise,  even an industry.  As such,  the ‘Body’  does not  exist,  because bodies operate not 
according to natural and universal laws, but rather to social and historical logics which are unstable and 
indeterminate and thus whose meaning can never be fixed. The constituted unfixed nature of the body is 
especially apparent in gender, which as Butler declares in her discussion of drag, becomes evident in dress.40 
Dress can also show how gender is undone in virtual religious worlds. For instance, in early February 
2010, UMZR made available free virtual versions of kesas, Zen Buddhist monk robes. When I logged on the 
day these became available, I came across an almost carnivalesque group helping a female human avatar edit 
the robes so that they would fit. As a default, the robes had been made for male humans, and there needed to 
be much editing for them to fit women, and other non-human avatars. This occurrence was not unique. As is 
clear when looking at fashion on Second Life, there is an unmarked and ubiquitous heteronormativity at the 
platform’s core. Even in Buddhist regions, which tend to be more equalitarian and are actually usually run by 
37 Such skepticism is true not only of academics but also those who practice Buddhism. See for instance “Jundo Cohen 
Dharam Talk Pt. 1” posted December 22, 2009 8:31 PM on Sit-A-Long Archive 2007-2009, http://www.treeleaf.org/sit-
a-long/archive/. Retrieved 18 August 2010.
38 For an online Zendo Website see Treeleaf Zendo, http://www.treeleaf.org/meditation.html. Retrieved 18 August 
2010.
39 See Butler 1987a, 237.
40 See Butler 2004, 213.
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female avatars, men are usually offered monk robes while women are offered such things as Tibetan tribal 
costumes. At first this seemed odd to me, because unlike other massive online platforms - such as World of 
Warcraft, which is created by game designers41 - almost all of Second Life’s content, including bodies, are 
made by residents (Figure 5). 
Figure 5: Bodies for sale on Second Life. Rather than undoing gender, heteronormative practices are often 
reinforced.
Naively, when I first logged on I assumed that without physical bodies there would be no gender trouble.
What Second Life illustrates is that the virtual body, just like the actual body, is a “stylized repetition of 
acts.” It is precisely the repetition of acts, gestures and discourses that produce bodies. Butler defines this as 
“a reiterative and citational practice;” as the “reiterative power of discourse to produce the phenomena that it 
regulates and constrains”.42 Building on the work of Jacques Derrida, by citation Butler means that it is the 
repetition of signs that enables one to comprehend a social practice, whether in real life or in a virtual world43. 
The body is the recycling of a “forced recitation of norms” (ibid). 
Second Life might seem to confirm a voluntarist ‘theory of gender invention’.44 It might seem that the ‘I’ 
that  is  being bodied somehow precedes the virtual  body,  and that  such a  theory stands  in conflict  with 
Butler’s notion that the “the body is always  already gendered”.45 Yet,  in Second Life avatars are always 
constrained and constituted by cultural norms, conventions and laws. Just as in the actual world a virtual body 
41 Word of Warcraft, https://us.battle.net/account/creation/wow/signup/. Retrieved 18 August 2010.
42 See Butler 1993, 2.
43 See Derrida 1991; 1993, 13, 226; 1997a, 51.
44 See Butler 1987b, 139.
45 See Butler 1989, 255.
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employs the historical and cultural norms that define the gender that it ought to be: how it should look, walk, 
talk, and sit, for example. Just like the actual world, in virtual worlds bodies do not exist outside of culture. In 
fact, what Second Life exposes is that bodies do not exist except in culturally specific ways of relating to 
others. As Robert R. Desjarlais writes: "The body has its invariably public dimension; constituted as a social 
phenomenon in the public sphere, my body is and is not mine”.46 In such a case, bodies are “an object rather 
than the subject of constitutive acts”.47 The body is thus a ‘doing’ – a performance – but not one undertaken 
by a subject “that might be said to pre-exist the deed”.48 
Virtual Embodiment
To  expose  how  bodies  are  constituted  by  public  acts  in  cyberspace,  one  needs  to  articulate  ‘virtual 
embodiment’.  In  the most general sense, embodiment signifies the experience of being in one’s body, and 
challenges the assumption that subjectivity – whether virtual or actual – can be reduced to mind. Embodiment 
lives the body. As Katherine Hayles argues in How We Became Posthuman, the body “can not exist without 
an embodied creature to enact it.”49 Such  embodiment,  however, is always contextual, it “never coincides 
exactly with ‘the body’, however that normalized concept is understood”.50 Embodiment for Hayles does not 
require an unceasing attachment to bodies, because embodiment is desubstalized. “Embodiment cannot exist 
without a material structure that always deviates in some measure from its abstract representations”.51 In other 
words, as  Hayles argues, the body is a cultural norm, an idealized form, while “embodiment is a specific 
instantiation... enmeshed within the specifics of place, time, physiology, and culture.”52 
The body is the potential of cultural acts, while embodiment is the subjectification that occurs when doing 
a particular body. It is not simply that the body is performed by a subject. Instead, this very “repetition is 
what enables a subject”.53 Following Foucault, Butler understands this as assujettissement, which translates 
roughly into English  as  ‘subjection’  or  ‘subjectificaion’.54 In  The Psychic  Life  of  Power,  Bulter  defines 
subjectificaion as “the process of becoming subordinated by power as well as the process of becoming a 
subject.”55 In  other  words,  power  activates subjects  at  the very moment  that  they are capable  of  action. 
Accordingly, as Butler articulates in Undoing Gender, “although we need norms in order to live, and to know 
46 See Desjarlais 1992, 21.
47 See Butler 1988, 519.
48 See Butler 1999, 33.
49 See Hayles 1999, 199.
50 See Hayles 1999, 196.
51 See Hayles 1999, 199.
52 See Hayles 1999, 196.
53 See Butler 1993, 95. 
54 See Foucault 1988.
55 See Butler 1997, 2.
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what direction to transform our social world [...] we are also constrained by norms in ways that sometimes do 
violence to us.”56
Virtual embodiment might seem like a contradiction. John Edward Campbell argues, however, that we 
need to challenge the “supposition conflating online interaction with bodily transcendence.”57 To assume that 
actual-world  embodiment  is  the  only  real  embodiment  imputes  a  naturalist  and  romantic  notion  of  an 
unmediated  encounter  with  the  world.58 It  assumes  that  embodiment  transcends  language.  Yet,  how we 
experience living in a body is not given but ideological: “we are also bodies in a social and cultural sense, and 
we experience that, too.”59 This notion of the socially constructed nature of bodies is illuminated by people 
with actual-world disabilities. Since the earliest days of text driven MUDs, scholars have noted the potential 
for allowing disabled persons to be embodied virtually in non-disabled forms. For instance on Virtual Ability 
Island, Alice Kruger, who suffers from multiple sclerosis, says that “[in actual] life I'm pretty much confined 
to my home and this room,” she points out. “I don’t see adults. It’s difficult to go out and talk with people.” 
She goes on to say that being her avatar is refreshing, “It’s really nice to be able to go out and dance. I love to 
dance.”60 
Just as one does actual bodies, one does virtual bodies. They are just more obvious, because virtual worlds 
make explicit the notion that bodies are not born but constituted through performance. As Butler writes, the 
body should be conceived not as “natural fact but as an historical idea.”61 As she maintains in “Sex and 
Gender in Simone de Beauvoir’s Second Sex,” bodying is “a modality of taking on or realizing possibilities,” 
which involves “a purposive and appropriate set of acts, the acquisition of a skill.”62 Virtual embodiment is 
not  about  corporal  manifestations  of  the  body,  but  rather  about  immersed  performative  actions  that  are 
constrained by cultural norms. In the simplest sense, a virtual body is one that inhabits virtual reality.63 Yet, 
as I argued above, because the virtual is desubstantialized, people in cyberspace are transversal – their bodies 
can be said to exist both in the virtual and the actual world. In other words, virtual embodiment is not so 
much about replacement of the actual world body, as it is about the extension of the body into cyberspace. 
This is not simple voluntary. For instance, in Second Life, while it is possible to subvert the platform’s 
heteronormativity – and there are some very transgressive examples (Figure 6) – a heteronormative gender 
matrix is actually more pronounced in Second Life than in the actual world. 
56 See Butler 2005, 206.
57 See Campbell 2004, 5.
58 See Graham 2002, 189.
59 See Ihde, 2002, xi.
60 “Disabled can have a new ‘real life’ in a virtual world …”, http://slenz.wordpress.com/2010/08/10/disability-and-
muves-–-vlenz-update-no-175-august-10-2010/. Retrieved 19 August 2010.
61 See Butler 1989, 254.
62 See Butler 1986, 36.
63 See Balsamo 2000, 489.
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Figure 6: Man-eating-tarantula-woman64 
One can see this at the level of the platform, where one must choose between being male or female, and also 
can only have one partner at time.65 This differs from many earlier MUDS (Multi-User Dungeon) where there 
is a choice of up to ten genders, and multiple partners. Heteronormativity is also reinforced at the level of 
resident  creations,  such  as  animations,  but  especially  at  the  level  of  dress,  where  there  is  a  clear 
differentiation between male and female fashion. One can conform to the norm, or one can oppose it. But in 
choosing what one wears, and thus who one is, even the most oblivious person is forced to take into account 
the gender implications. 
In Second Life, the virtually embodied performance of self is interdependent on three minor factors and 
one major factor. First, in Second Life one’s embodiment is determined by how one appears to others. One 
can change one’s body and shape, which includes gender, race and species. One can also change clothes and 
accessories. Embodiment is also determined by actions. In Second Life, one can change posture and gestures. 
When it comes to religious practices, there are many religious gestures such as “Worship the Lord!” and a 
Heads Up Device (HUD) called the Triple Jewel Hud that allows one to ‘gassho’ (Figure 7). 
64 See Woods 2006, 85.
65 A Second Life partner is a way to designate officially in your avatars profile that you are having a relationship with 
another resident. See http://wiki.secondlife.com/wiki/How_do_I_make_someone_my_partner. Retrieved 30 August 
2010. 
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Figure 7: Clint using the ‘Triple Jewel HUD’ to perform a gassho.
One can also change one’s type of communication, such as in typing in chat or using voice. 
The major factor of virtual embodiment occurs when we are interpolated into a social network. In the 
Phenomenology of  Perception Merleau-Ponty writes “[i]n so far  as I have hands,  feet,  a body,  I  sustain 
around me intentions which are not dependent upon my decisions and which affect my surroundings in a way 
which I do not choose.”66 The body is never self-present. It is not fixed by nature. Instead, embodiment is 
created in relation to others, as one is perceived to be a particular sex, race or ethnic group. As Elizabeth 
Grosz writes, “alterity is the very possibility and process of embodiment.”67 This is not to deny the difference 
between virtual and actual bodies: the actual world ‘skin and flesh’ are vulnerable in ways the virtual body 
can  never  be.  Still,  both  in  the  actual  world  and  the  virtual,  “[o]ne  comes  to  ‘exist’  by  virtue  of  this 
fundamental dependency on the address of the Other.”68 In both the actual world and the virtual world the 
Body is the “the site where ‘doing’ and ‘being done to’ become equivocal.”69 Doing and being done occur in 
virtual worlds through ‘interactivity’, the feeling that one is more than a ‘spectator’, As Allucquère Rosanne 
Stone argues, in Will the Real Body Please Stand Up? “Interaction is the physical concretization of a desire to 
escape the flatness and merge into the created system. It is the sense in which the ‘spectator’ is more than a 
participant,  but  becomes  both participant  in  and creator  of  the  simulation”.70 This  interactivity can be a 
human-human relationship in which one communicates with others, or a human-data relationship created by 
the manipulation of digital objects and navigation through cyberspace.
66 See Merleau-Ponty 1962, 440.
67 See Grosz 1994, 209.
68 See Butler 1997, 5.
69 See Butler 2005, 21.
70 See Stone 1991, 92.
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How interactivity generates the norms of virtual embodiment can be seen by looking at two types  of 
Second Life religious communities  and their  relation to dress.  The first,  fundamentalism,  is  a style  that 
chooses to hold fast to inherited and/or ascribed social identity. Often one of the places that fundamentalism 
is inscribed on the body is the relation between gender and dress, especially women’s dress. Such a policing 
can be seen in the Second Life region “Bible Island”, which describes itself as “a neat place where there is all 
kinds of Bible studies,” but warns “PLEASE DRESS MODESTLY.” The reason given for this is that “Bible 
Island is a Family Area where many children watch their parents as they come here to study the Bible.” When 
one teleports in, the first thing one encounters is a sign that reads “Women: do not show any cleavage or 
stomach. Also, your dress is to be long enough to lap over your knees when you sit down. Men: Wear pants 
and a shirt that is buttoned up.” At the landing point is a teleporter offered for women that sends them to a 
dressing room. In the Dressing room are a number of dresses that look like something out of The Handmaid’s  
Tale71 (Figure 8). 
Figure 8: A Christian dress offered at Bible Island (Photo G.P. Grieve).
Along with the dress, on offer are modest undergarment, and flat shoes. No appropriate dress is available for 
men. 
A second religious strategy is ‘hybridization’, which does not strive for a fixed identity, but rather seeks to 
distinguish itself from others. One can see this hybridity in Neo-pagan fashion on second life. For instance, 
The Anam Turas Island Pagan Learning Grove is described as “a place for people to freely find their path of 
spiritual growth.” Such growth is seen to stem from one’s inner self. But how do you display this? As one 
71 See Atwood 1985.
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pagan said to a Cardean interviewer, “spirituality should not tell you what to wear, but you should dress for 
magical  reasons.  If  you  are going to follow a religion that  favors diversity,  wear whatever you desire!” 
Ironically, in this world of individuals, how one marks one’s distinction is by buying into gender norms, and 
dress plays an important part of this. In such Pagan regions, there are no uniforms or vestments. Rather, vast 
regions on Second Life are devoted to pagan shopping. One can spend a lot of Linden trying to be distinctive 
(Figure 9). 
Figure 9: Shopping for identity – a Pagan mall on Second Life.
Conclusion: Virtually Undoing the Body
The sitting period ends with one ring of the bell, followed by a brief. The simplest and most often simply 
being: "By this merit may all sentient beings attain complete awakening.” The timekeeper then types the 
emoticon “_/!\_” (for gassho). Most of the other people present also type this emoticon into their computers, 
which causes a cascade of _/!\_s to flow down the screen. In  Routes, James  Clifford was not necessarily 
condemning the ethnography of such virtual cloud communities. Instead, he was using the Internet as a litmus 
test to evaluate anthropologic writing circa 1997 when the piece was published. That is,  the keyword in 
Clifford’s statement might be ‘currently’ One might argue, pointing to works such as Escobar’s Welcome to  
Cyberia (2000[1994]), and  Boellstorff’s  Coming of Age in Second Life  (2008), and Golub’s  Being in the 
World (of Warcraft) (2010), that ethnography has matured and no longer suffers these earlier delusions. 
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Yet, Clifford’s critique of ‘awkwardness’, even if dated, does point out for many what still seems to be 
missing from online virtual worlds, namely, ‘immersion’ – the feeling that you are there. On December 12th, 
2008, after the sitting period had ended, I stood, ‘gassho-ed’ to the altar, and walked slowly out of the zendo. 
I then said good-bye to my companions, teleported back to my house, and slogged off.  I  shut down the 
computer and stood up from my chair. Once again my attention was brought back into the actual world. How 
should we theorize such practices?  Hinging on Second Life’s Buddhist online silent mediation, I maintain 
that what makes ethnography possible in virtual worlds is ‘immersion’,  the sense that you are present in 
cyberspace.  Utilizing  Judith  Butler’s  theory  of  gender,  I  have  proven  that  while  sensorial  realism  and 
collective projects are important,  what makes immersion possible in virtual worlds is virtual embodiment, 
which can be defined as immersed bodily performances  that  occur in cyberspace.  To articulate how the 
virtual  embodiment  operates,  this  paper has  theorized the  virtual  as a desubstantialized and nondualistic 
hinge. I described the denizens of these worlds as ‘residents’, social entities which are woven together from 
an avatar and its user.  We defined there associations as ‘cloud communities’,  groups that are temporary,  
flexible, elastic and is inexpensive in the social capital required to join or to leave. 
Embodying the field is key for ethnography whether conducted in the virtual or actual world. At its best, 
ethnography is a way of exposing something shared and lived in the everyday world, but which cannot be 
articulated in linguistic terms. The body is a key site for such analysis. As Robert Desjarlais argues, in Body 
and Emotion, the body allows for experiential understanding of others’ worlds, “from the way in which they 
held their bodies to how they felt, hurt and healed.”72 Often bodies are overlooked in religious practice. This 
is especially true for online religion, where  the study of new media privileges the linguistic, the discursive 
and cognized over the visceral and tacit. Moreover, a performative understanding of the body resonates with 
Buddhism, which recognizes neither the mind/body dualism that characterizes much of Western philosophy, 
nor the concept of an essential self, such as the Hindu atman. In Buddhist doctrine, mind and body are both 
subject to inevitable processes of change.73
Virtual embodiment makes it clear that religion does not just happen in people’s minds. Even ‘belief’ is a 
historically situated bodily practice.74 I am not arguing for a return to essentialized corporeal notions of the 
body that use the myth of biology to legitimate gender norms. Instead what virtual embodiment shows is that 
there is no such thing as a natural or universal body, which is free of history and culture. Moreover, bodies 
cannot be reduced to experience, mental states, intentionality or to a subject, and are better understood as a 
set of skills and practices. While embodiment is constituted through social discourses, it resists reduction to 
72 See Desjarlais 1992, 13.
73 See Yuasa 1984.
74 The conception of belief as a bodily practice stemmed from a conversation with Eugene Rogers about the bodily 
practice of “reading.” This notion of belief as a socio-historical artifact is clear in Bellah’s seminal chapter: “Religion 
and Belief: The Historical Background of ‘Non-Belief’” ( Beyond Belief: 216-229) I would also like to acknowledge 
Ben Ramsey for pointing out how ‘belief’ operates as a bodily practice in the film Jesus Camp (2006) .See the trailer 
for Jesus Camp at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6RNfL6IVWCE. Retrieved 9 Aug 2010. 
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linguistic or visual signification. It is not that embodiment is somehow more ontologically fundamental or 
more natural than other discourses. Rather,  because embodiment plays  a part  in the various processes of 
awareness, it is a set of skills that we dwell in like a fish in water. Because each of us ‘is’ our body, the 
cluster of practices that generates embodiment is often uninterpreted, or assumed to be ‘natural’.  Virtual 
embodiment undoes these bodies, by exposing them as ‘a cultural sign’.75 Virtual embodiment indicates that 
the  body  is  not  a  stable  platform  on  which  one  inscribes  an  identity,  but  rather  a  condensation  of 
performances, feelings and desires grounded in lived practices.
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